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Four-dimensionalism and eternalism are theories on time, change, and 
persistence. Contemporary Christian philosophers and theologians have ad-
opted four-dimensionalism and eternalism for various reasons. Many find it 
to be derived from certain interpretations of the special theory of relativity. 
Others hold it because it is said to comport well with truth-maker theory. In 
recent literature one can find Christians adopting four-dimensionalism and 
eternalism for explicitly theological reasons as well as using it to explicate 
Christian doctrine. For instance, Katherin Rogers and T. J. Mawson have 
used it to defend divine omniscience and timelessness, Oliver Crisp has used 
it to articulate the doctrine of atonement, and Michael Rea has deployed it to 
make sense of original sin.1 It would seem, then, that four-dimensional eter-
nalism is a fruitful metaphysical doctrine. But should Christians be four-di-
mensional eternalists? There appear to be various areas of Christian thought 
that conflict with four-dimensional eternalism, and these conflicts have not 
been fully considered. 
AbsTRAcT: Four-dimensionalism and eternalism are theories on time, change, and persistence. 
Christian philosophers and theologians have adopted four-dimensional eternalism for various 
reasons. In this paper I shall attempt to argue that four-dimensional eternalism conflicts with 
Christian thought. Section I will lay out two varieties of four-dimensionalism—perdurantism 
and stage theory—along with the typically associated ontologies of time of eternalism and 
growing block. I shall contrast this with presentism and endurantism. Section II will look at 
some of the purported theological benefits of adopting four-dimensionalism and eternalism. 
Section III will examine arguments against four-dimensional eternalism from the problem of 
evil. Section IV will argue that four-dimensional eternalism causes problems for Christian 
eschatology.
1. See T. J. Mawson, “Divine Eternity,” International Journal for the Philosophy of Religion 
64 (2008): xxx–xxx; Katherin Rogers, “Anselmian Eternalism: The Presence of a Timeless 
God,” Faith and Philosophy 24 (2007): xxx–xxx; Oliver Crisp, “Non-Penal Substitution,” 
International Journal of Systematic Theology 9 (2007): xxx–xxx. Also, Crisp, “Original Sin and 
Atonement,” in Oxford Handbook of Philosophical Theology, ed. Thomas Flint and Michael 
Rea (New York: Oxford University Press, 2009). Michael Rea, “The Metaphysics of Original 
Sin,” in Persons: Human and Divine, ed. Peter van Inwagen and Dean Zimmerman (New York: 
Oxford University Press, 2007).
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In order to answer this question, several things are called for. Section I of 
this paper will lay out two varieties of four-dimensionalism—perdurantism 
and stage theory—along with its typically associated ontologies of time—
eternalism and growing block. I shall contrast this with presentism and 
endurantism. Section II will explicate some of the purported theological 
benefits of adopting four-dimensionalism and eternalism. Sections III and 
IV will examine the problems that arise when four-dimensional eternalism 
is combined with Christian belief. Specifically, four-dimensional eternalism 
exaggerates the problem of evil and causes problems for eschatology. As 
such, Christians ought not to be four-dimensional eternalists.
I. The Ontology of Time and Persistence through Time
Presentism, the growing block, and eternalism are theories about the 
ontology of time, or about what moments of time exist. Each is typically 
linked with a theory of change and persistence through time. Presentism 
is usually held alongside endurantism, whereas the growing block and 
eternalism typically hold some version of four-dimensionalism. Allow me 
to elaborate.
Presentism is the thesis that only the present, the now, exists. The past 
no longer exists and the future does not yet exist.2 Time involves temporal 
becoming, or absolute generation, as well as real passage from one moment 
to the next. New things that did not formerly exist come into existence, and 
other things pass out of existence or cease to exist.3 For the presentist, it 
simply is the case that the only objects that exist are the ones that presently 
exist. As Trenton Merricks says of presentism, “an object has only those 
properties it has at the present time. The difference between past, present, 
and future is metaphysical, not perspectival.”4 
On presentism, an object endures through time. To say that an object 
endures through time is to say that an object is wholly present at each 
moment of its existence. Numerically one and the same object exists at each 
time that it exists, and it does not have parts at other times. On presentism 
and endurantism, objects undergo change by gaining and losing accidental 
properties over time. Let us say that some object O begins to exist at time t1 
and persists all the way through to time t3. On this account O exists entirely 
at each instant of time. Given presentism, as t2
 comes into existence t1
 ceases 
to exist and t3 does not yet exist. So O exists entirely at each instant only 
2. Thomas M. Crisp, “Presentism,” in The Oxford Handbook of Metaphysics, ed. Michael J. 
Loux and Dean W. Zimmerman (New York: Oxford University Press, 2003), 212.
3. St. Augustine, Confessions, 9.20; Anselm, Monologion, 21, 22, and 24. Also, Proslogion, 
13, 19, and 22.
4. Trenton Merricks, “Goodbye Growing Block,” in Oxford Studies in Metaphysics, vol. 2, 
ed. Dean W. Zimmerman (New York: Oxford University Press, 2006), 103.
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when that instant is the present. It is not as if O exists wholly at all of the 
instants of t1
 through t3 simultaneously because all of those instances do not 
have equal ontological existence. As O endures through time it will gain 
and lose various accidental, or nonessential, properties. Let us say that O 
is an armchair. At t1 the armchair is blue, and then at t2 someone paints the 
armchair such that at t3 the armchair is red. The armchair has retained all of 
its essential properties, but it has lost one accidental property—that of being 
blue—and gained a new accidental property—that of being red. 
The growing block and eternalism both have the same basic feature 
of seeing time as a four-dimensional spacetime manifold, but differ in 
certain respects.5 On eternalism, all moments of time have equal ontological 
existence. To put it roughly the past, present, and the future all exist—they are 
all equally real. To put it more technically there is no real distinction between 
past, present, and future. There just is the four-dimensional spacetime 
manifold with no privileged moment that marks the present.6 On this account 
there is no real passage of time because all moments of time exist. Nothing 
ever comes into existence nor ceases to exist because everything simply 
does exist in the spacetime manifold. As such, the experience of temporal 
passage is illusory. Growing block theorists agree that spacetime is a four-
dimensional manifold, but they maintain that only the past and the present 
exist whereas the future does not. Time is dynamic in the sense that new 
things really do come into existence as new time slices are added to the four-
dimensional spacetime manifold.
Time slices are merely instants of time that can stand in earlier than and 
later than relations to other instants. They are much like points on a map. In 
fact most eternalists and growing blockers see a close connection between 
being located in space and being located at a time, whereas presentists 
reject the similarity between being located in space and located at a time.7 
For the growing block theorist new time slices are constantly being added 
to spacetime. The eternalist holds that all time slices simply exist in the 
spacetime manifold. None ever come into nor pass out of existence.
Presentists hold that objects endure through time. Growing block 
theorists and eternalists hold that objects are four-dimensional in that they 
persist through time by having temporal parts. Four-dimensionalism is 
a family of views about the nature of temporal parts, and it comes in two 
basic forms—perdurantism and stage theory. According to Michael Rea 
5. Michael Rea, “Four-Dimensionalism,” in The Oxford Handbook of Metaphysics, ed. 
Michael J. Loux and Dean W. Zimmerman (New York: Oxford University Press, 2003), 247.
6. J. J. C. Smart, “The Tenseless Theory of Time,” in Contemporary Debates in Metaphysics, 
ed. Theodore Sider, John Hawthorne, and Dean W. Zimmer (Malden: Blackwell Publishing, 
2008), 227.
7. Trenton Merricks, Truth and Ontology (New York: Oxford University Press, 2007), 121–
5. Also, Theodore Sider, “Four-Dimensionalism,” Philosophical Review 106 (1997): 197 and 
204.
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endurantists hold that objects “last over time by being wholly present at 
every moment at which they exist,” whereas perdurantists hold that objects 
“last over time without being wholly present at every moment at which 
they exist.”8 As Sally Haslanger explains, “On the perdurantist’s conception 
of persistence, an object persists through time in a way analogous to how 
an object is extended through space.”9 The perdurantist sees an object as 
being spread out across the four-dimensional spacetime manifold by having 
temporal parts. Each temporal part exists at a particular point in spacetime 
and together they constitute the object. The object does not exist as a whole 
throughout time, but instead temporal parts of the object exist at different 
times. On presentism and endurantism there simply is no such thing as 
temporal parts. 
To complicate matters a bit, perdurantism has various similarities to 
stage theory. Both involve an object having temporal parts at times, and 
both explain change in terms of different temporal parts having different 
properties at different times.10 In order to understand the difference between 
the two, it is helpful to note that perdurantism is sometimes called worm 
theory. On worm theory objects “stretch out through time just as (we all 
agree) earthworms stretch out through space.”11 When referring to a perdurant 
object we speak of the entire spacetime worm. On stage theory “the world is 
full of four-dimensional objects with temporal parts, but when we talk about 
ordinary objects like boats and people, we talk about brief temporal parts 
or ‘stages’ of four-dimensional objects.”12 Perhaps an illustration will help. 
Imagine that we ask Tony Bennett to sing “I Left My Heart in San 
Francisco.” The endurantist would say that Tony Bennett is entirely present 
throughout the 2 minutes and 46 seconds of his performance. There is 
numerically only one thing, Tony Bennett, which endures through the song. 
The perdurantist would see things differently. For each second of the song 
there is a temporal part of Tony Bennett. According to the worm theorist, 
when you put all of the temporal parts together you get Tony Bennett. Tony 
is not identical to any of the temporal parts, but somehow through the right 
causal connections and a particular kind of psychological continuity, the 
temporal parts together constitute the spacetime worm that is Tony. (In 
calling Tony a worm this is not to say anything of his moral character. I’m 
sure he is a standup gentleman.) The stage theorist will say that each temporal 
part is a Tony Bennett. There is the Tony Bennett that exists at t1 and the 
8. Michael Rea, “Four-Dimensionalism,” in The Oxford Handbook of Metaphysics, ed. 
Michael J. Loux and Dean W. Zimmerman (New York: Oxford University Press, 2003), 247. 
9. Sally Haslanger, “Persistence through Time,” in The Oxford Handbook of Metaphysics, 
318.
10. Katherine Hawley, How Things Persist (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2001), 11–12.
11. Katherine Hawley, “Temporal Parts,” in Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy, ed. 
Edward Zalta, http://plato.stanford.edu/entries/temporal-parts/.
12. Hawley, “Temporal Parts.”
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Tony Bennett that exists at t2. Worm theory and stage theory have the same 
underlying four-dimensionalist ontology of temporal parts. The difference 
between the two is over where the proper name goes. The worm theorist 
holds that the proper name applies to the spacetime worm, whereas the stage 
theorist says the proper name applies to each temporal counterpart or stage. 
It is sometimes held that endurantism could be compatible with the 
growing block or eternalism. Yet many think that a problem arises from 
intrinsic properties and change if endurantism is combined with either of 
these ontologies of time.13 This is because the same object would have 
contradictory intrinsic properties. Say eternalism is true, and that every 
moment of “I Left My Heart in San Francisco” is on the same ontological 
par. If Tony were an endurant being, he would exist as a whole at every 
moment of the song. As such he would have both of the properties of signing 
“I left my heart” at time t1
 and “on a hill it calls to me” at t3. He would have 
the properties “standing” at t2 and “sitting at the piano” at t4. How can Tony 
be sitting and standing? Aren’t these contradictory intrinsic properties? Since 
Tony exists as a whole at each moment of the song, and since each moment 
of the song is equally real, all of the properties are within Tony’s domain of 
discourse. 
How do we remove the contradiction? The standard move for the 
eternalist is to adopt a four-dimensionalist thesis of temporal parts. Tony 
Bennett does not have the contradictory properties. Instead, only the 
temporal part of Tony that exists at t2 has the property “standing” and only 
the temporal part that exists at t4 has the property “sitting at the piano.” The 
endurantist can remove the contradiction by adopting presentism. On this 
scheme, Tony had the property “standing” but that moment no longer exists, 
so Tony no longer has that property. He only exemplifies the properties that 
exist at the present moment. 
With these distinctions laid out before us, we can begin to delve 
deeper into issues related to four-dimensionalism that have not been fully 
acknowledged by Christian thinkers who wish to use this metaphysical thesis 
in Christian doctrine. Four-dimensionalism is often held to come with certain 
metaphysical commitments that a presentist and endurantist would most 
likely not accept. One such commitment is metaphysical universalism. The 
metaphysical doctrine of “[u]niversalism is the view that any collection of 
objects whatsoever has a sum, an object they compose.” This is sometimes 
called unrestricted mereology. “Any combination of temporal parts of any 
objects from any times, no matter how scattered and disparate, composes 
13. See Thomas M. Crisp, “Presentism,” in The Oxford Handbook of Metaphysics, 220. 
Theodore Sider, Four-Dimensionalism (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2001), chap. 4. Also, 
Katherine Hawley, “Why Temporary Properties Are Not Relations between Physical Objects 
and Times,” Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society 98 (1998): 211–16.
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an object.”14 It could be possible for a four-dimensionalist to reject this 
metaphysical doctrine, though that will depend on other metaphysical 
and theological commitments she holds. For instance, she might adopt 
metaphysical universalism because she takes objects like bicycles and 
persons to be mere conventions.15 Or she could hold to universalism in order 
to argue that Christ’s atonement involves fallen human persons becoming 
part of a larger four-dimensional object with Christ.16 How this is possible 
without Christ having sinful parts is beyond me, but I digress. 
Another metaphysical commitment that four-dimensionalists typically 
hold, and that presentists typically reject, is Humean supervenience. Katherine 
Hawley describes this as the view that “facts about which intrinsic properties 
are instantiated at which points determine all the facts there are. There are no 
irreducibly holistic facts. In conjunction with perdurantism, this entails that 
all the facts about a given persisting object supervene upon intrinsic facts 
about its briefest temporal parts.”17 Again, a four-dimensionalist may reject 
this depending on her other metaphysical and theological commitments. 
What Christian thinkers must do, however, is make it clear which aspects of 
four-dimensionalism they wish to accept or reject if they wish to use four-
dimensionalism in the defense and development of Christian doctrine.
With these metaphysical distinctions in mind we can now turn to the 
main question of this paper. Should Christians be four-dimensionalists? I 
shall argue that Christians should not be four-dimensionalists since adopting 
four-dimensionalism exaggerates the problem of evil and wreaks havoc on 
eschatology. But in order for the reader to make an informed opinion, it will 
be helpful to see some of the alleged theological benefits to adopting four-
dimensionalism and eternalism. As such, I shall address those issues first.
II. Reaping the Theological Benefits of 
Four-Dimensionalism and Eternalism
As noted above, various Christian philosophers have employed four-
dimensionalism and eternalism to develop theological doctrines. Several 
of these proposals seem underdeveloped or undesirable at the moment, but 
14. Katherine Hawley, “Temporal Parts.” See also Sider, Four-Dimensionalism, 7. Hud 
Hudson, The Metaphysics of Hyperspace (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2005), 5–9.
15. Hawley, “Temporal Parts.” Also Mark Heller, “Temporal Parts of Four-Dimensional 
Objects,” in Metaphysics: Contemporary Readings, ed. Michael J. Loux (London: Routledge, 
2001), 343–8.
16. Though Oliver Crisp does not explicitly endorse metaphysical universalism, it seems 
to me that is what is needed in order to make sense of his doctrine of the atonement. See his 
“Non-Penal Substitution” and “Original Sin and Atonement.” It might even be the case that 
he only needs an unrestricted mereology for his doctrine of atonement, and can do away with 
four-dimensionalism.
17. Hawley, “Temporal Parts.”
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one area has received enough attention and development to be worthy of 
comment.18 In the current debates over God’s relationship to time, it is widely 
agreed that God cannot be timeless if presentism is true, but that God can be 
timeless if four-dimensional eternalism is true.19 One standard move amongst 
divine temporalists is to argue that four-dimensional eternalism is false, so 
divine timelessness is false.20 Philosophers like Paul Helm, T. J. Mawson, 
and Katherin Rogers have attempted to defend four-dimensional eternalism 
and develop its theological benefits. As a divine temporalist, I do not see 
these as theological benefits.21 Yet, atemporalists do see divine timelessness 
as a benefit. As such, it is these purported benefits for atemporalists that I will 
focus on in this section.
In order to understand these alleged theological benefits one must have 
a working definition of divine timelessness. The traditional understanding 
of divine timelessness is that God exists (a) without beginning, (b) 
without end, (c) without succession, and (d) without temporal location or 
extension. Traditionally this has been explained in terms of presentism and 
endurantism. One of the most popular ways classical Christian theologians 
articulated divine timelessness was to say that God exists as a whole, all at 
once, in an eternal present that lacks a before and after. It is (c)–(d) that the 
temporalist denies, and what the atemporalist seeks to defend by adopting 
four-dimensional eternalism.
The first purported theological benefit of adopting four-dimensional 
eternalism is that it avoids the common objection to divine timelessness 
from creation ex nihilo. Classical theologians held to presentism and divine 
timelessness.22 A common theological prolegomena throughout Church 
18. As noted above, four-dimensionalism has been used to flesh out original sin and 
atonement. Oliver Crisp has begun to develop a doctrine of penal substitionary atonement, but 
it is somewhat underdeveloped at this time. However, the main objections to penal substitution 
are moral and biblical. Four-dimensionalism is of no help in defending this doctrine from these 
objections, so its fruitfulness for the atonement is limited. See Mark C. Murphy, “Not Penal 
Substitution But Vicarious Punishment,” in Faith and Philosophy 26 (2009): xxx–xxx; and 
Gerald O’Collins, Jesus Our Redeemer: A Christian Approach to Salvation (Oxford: Oxford 
University Press, 2007).
19. For instance see Kathrin Rogers and William Hasker, “Anselm and the Classical Idea 
of God: A Debate,” in Philosophy of Religion: Key Thinkers, ed. Jeffrey J. Jordan (London: 
Continuum, 2011).
20. Alan G. Padgett, God, Eternity, and the Nature of Time (Eugene: Wipf & Stock, 1992). 
William Lane Craig, Time and Eternity: Exploring God’s Relationship to Time (Wheaton: 
Crossway Books, 2001). Garrett J. DeWeese, God and the Nature of Time (Burlington: Ashgate, 
2004).
21. For more on this see my “Divine Perfection and Creation,” The Heythrop Journal 
(forthcoming), and In Search of a Timeless God (forthcoming). 
22. See Robert Pasnau, “On Existing All at Once,” in God, Eternity, and Time, ed. Christian 
Tapp and Edmund Runggaldier (Surrey: Ashgate, 2011). Also, Anselm, Proslogion, 13 and 22; 
Gregory of Nyssa, Against Eunomius, 1.42; Augustine, City of God, 11.21; and Confessions, 11. 
For a discussion of Augustine’s puzzles over the present see Richard Sorabji, Time, Creation 
and the Continuum: Theories in Antiqity and the Early Middle Ages (London: Duckworth, 
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history has centered on divine timelessness and creation ex nihilo. Classical 
theologians, following various biblical claims, held that there was a state 
of affairs where God existed alone without creation, and a state of affairs 
where God exists with creation. Creation is not coeternal with God, because 
nothing can be coeternal with God. But a problem quickly arises for divine 
timelessness. If there is a state of affairs where God exists without creation 
and another where God exists with creation, God has a before and after in 
His life. Theologians and philosophers like Augustine, John Philoponus, 
Peter Lombard, Thomas Aquinas, and Bonaventure have attempted to deal 
with this problem whilst assuming presentism. Helm and Rogers avoid this 
problem altogether by making the four-dimensional world coeternal with 
God.23 There is no state of affairs where God exists without creation, so no 
worry of a before and after in His life. Elsewhere I have argued that this does 
not preserve an adequate understanding of the doctrine of creation ex nihilo, 
but I will set that issue aside.24
A second purported theological benefit is that by adopting four-
dimensional eternalism one avoids the problem of divine sustaining for 
divine timelessness. Christians are committed to the claim that God is 
sustaining the world as it unfolds through time. On presentism God sustains 
a moment, then ceases to sustain it, and then sustains another. God would 
constantly be doing something different and thus not be immutable, simple, 
and timeless.25 On four-dimensional eternalism this is not the case. Moments 
of time do not slough off into the nonexistent past and there are no yet-
to-exist future moments. All of time exists and is sustained by God in one 
timeless immutable act. God, it is argued, can exist all at once instead of 
having to lose moments of His life as He would on presentism.
The third and final purported theological benefit that I will mention is 
related to the problem for divine timelessness from omniscience. Again, 
Classical theologians held presentism and divine timelessness. They also 
made the claim that our present syncs up with, or is contained in, God’s 
eternal present.26 As the Protestant scholastic Francis Turretin explains, “the 
past, while it was, coexisted in eternity, the present now coexists with it, and 
the future will coexist with it.”27 A common theological prolegomena during 
1983), 29–32; J. R. Lucas, A Treatise on Time and Space (London: Methuen, 1973), chap. 4; 
Boethius, Trinity Is One God Not Three Gods, 4; Thomas Aquinas, Quaestiones Disputatae De 
Veritate, q.2.12.
23. Paul Helm, Eternal God: A Study of God without Time, 2nd ed. (New York: Oxford 
University Press, 2010), chap. 14. Also, Helm, “Divine Timeless Eternity,” in God & Time: 
Four Views, ed. Gregory E. Ganssle (Downers Grove, IL: InterVarsity, 2001), 47–51. Katherin 
Rogers, “Anselm on Eternity as the Fifth Dimension,” The Saint Anselm Journal 32 (2006): 3.
24. See my “Divine Perfection and Creation,” The Heythrop Journal.
25. Rogers, “Back to Eternalism,” 331.
26. Rory Fox, Time and Eternity in Mid-Thirteenth-Century Thought (Oxford: Oxford 
University Press, 2006), 89–91.
27. Francis Turretin, Institutes of Elenctic Theology, 3.11.8–9.
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the Middle Ages, Reformation, and today surrounds God’s knowledge of 
the present. For thinkers like Augustine and Peter Lombard, the question 
was this: does God’s knowledge grow when He creates the world? It would 
seem as if there is something new for God to know once the word comes into 
existence. God would go from knowing that <The universe does not exist> 
to knowing that <The universe does exist>.28 For Aquinas, the question was 
a bit different. Does God have knowledge of temporal concrete particulars? 
Creatures have knowledge of temporal concrete particulars. God is a perfect 
knower, so He should know everything creatures do and more.29 This issue 
is closely related to the question that is discussed at length in contemporary 
debates. In contemporary debates the question is this: does God know what 
time it is now?30 If God knows what time it is now, His knowledge will 
constantly be changing since “now” will continually pick out different 
moments as time moves forward. As such, God cannot be timeless. If God 
does not know what time it is now, He is not omniscient.
By adopting four-dimensional eternalism one avoids the problems 
of God’s knowledge growing as the world unfolds through time. Strictly 
speaking, there is no unfolding through time. From God’s perspective, the 
best perspective, the whole four-dimensional universe simply exists. There 
is no knowledge for God to gain. Can God know what time it is now? No, 
because there is no now with a unique ontological status. Granted, from the 
perspective of temporal creatures things appear as if the present is unique 
and that the past no longer exists and the future does not yet exist. This, 
however, is not the way reality is. Terms like “past,” “present,” and “future” 
are relative from the perspective of temporal parts or person stages. From 
God’s perspective, the best perspective, He sees the world as it actually 
is. From His perspective there is no “now,” there is just the entire four-
dimensional spacetime world.31
Ultimately, I do not think that four-dimensional eternalism saves divine 
timelessness since the Christian God is still related to a changing, temporal 
28. Augustine, City of God, 11.21; The Trinity 6.11 and 15.22; On Genesis, 5.6. Peter 
Lombard, Sentences, Book 1, Dist. 35.9.1–2; and Dist. 34. Cf. John Philoponus, Against Proclus 
on the Eternity of the World 12–18, trans. James Wilberding (London: Duckworth, 2006),74–81.
29. Aquinas, Quaestiones Disputatae De Veritate, q.2.1–14; Summa Contra Gentiles, 1.65–
7.
30. William Lane Craig, “Divine Eternity,” in The Oxford Handbook of Philosophical 
Theology, ed. Thomas P Flint and Michael C. Rea (New York: Oxford University Press, 2009), 
159–60. Nicholas Wolterstorff, Inquiring about God: Selected Essays (New York: Cambridge 
University Press, 2010 ), 150–2. Interestingly, divine temporalists from the seventeenth and 
eighteenth century, like Samuel Clarke, Pierre Gassendi, and Thomas Hobbes, did not offer 
this objection. They seem to agree with Augustine’s solution to the problem—a perfect being 
does not know what exists now because a perfect being would not be perfect if its knowledge 
depended upon the changing temporal world.
31. Rogers, Perfect Being Theology (Edinburgh: Edinburgh University Press, 2000), 60–
4. “Anselm on Eternity as the Fifth Dimension,” 2–7; The Anselmian Approach to God and 
Creation (Lewiston: Edwin Mellen, 1997), 209–12.
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world and even becomes incarnate and thus exists at particular times and 
possesses temporal parts. The eternalist world is not an unchanging, timeless 
world. However, I will set that aside for this paper. In the remainder of this 
paper I will focus my critique on four-dimensional eternalism since it is said 
by its proponents to salvage divine timelessness, and for various Christians 
that is a significant theological benefit, though, for theologians such as 
myself, this is not a benefit. I take it that my arguments below could be 
slightly modified to work against the growing block view as well, but will 
not focus on the growing block since it does not offer the same advantages 
for divine timelessness that eternalism is said to bring. I shall argue that four-
dimensional eternalism exaggerates the problem of evil and wreaks havoc 
on Christian eschatological hope and practice. As such, Christians who hold 
to, or are tempted to hold to, four-dimensional eternalism should reconsider 
their ontology of time and their theory of persistence through time.
III. Four-Dimensional Eternalism, 
Evil, and Christian Belief 
A brief note is in order on personal persistence through time and 
anthropology. There are many views within philosophical anthropology such 
as dualism, physicalism, and material constitution.32 I am an unrepentant 
substance dualist, presentist, and endurantist. I hold that a person is an 
immaterial mind. Human persons are minds embodied in human organisms. 
A person persists through time by existing as a whole, or all at once. The 
numerically same mind who suffers in this life, will be the numerically same 
mind who shall receive eschatological healing. I also hold that our personal 
survival of death matters deeply to us. I want to be the numerically same 
person who receives eschatological healing. 
Most four-dimensionalists reject substance dualism and opt for some 
form of physicalism, though it is possible to be a substance dualist.33 On 
four-dimensionalism personal persistence is typically understood in terms 
of psychological continuity since it explicitly denies numerical identity over 
time. The person stage that exists at time t1  persists by having a temporal 
counterpart at some later time t2. This later temporal counterpart will 
exemplify a psychological continuity to the earlier temporal counterpart in 
that each will have the same beliefs, memories, desires, and so on.34 Four-
32. Eric T. Olson, What Are We? A Study in Personal Ontology (New York: Oxford 
University Press, 2007).
33. Hawley lists dualism as a possibility throughout How Things Persist. For a materialist 
account of personal persistence on four-dimensionalism see Hud Hudson, A Materialist 
Metaphysics of the Human Person (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University, 2001).
34. Tobias Hansson Wahlberg, “Can I Be an Instantaneous Stage and Yet Persist Through 
Time?,” Metaphysica 9 (2008): xxx–xxx.
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dimensionalists also typically hold that personal survival of death does not 
really matter to us. As Eric Steinhart proclaims, “Personal identity is not 
retained in the resurrection. It is sacrificed.”35 According to Steinhart, and 
others, what really matters to us is that we have later resurrected temporal 
counterparts. Apparently, human persons do not really concern themselves 
with personal survival, but only care about having later temporal counterparts. 
I should think that this will be quite shocking news to most human persons to 
hear that personal survival is not what matters to them, but I digress. 
It is at this point that I think one can begin to see the failure of four-
dimensionalism for Christianity. On standard Christian defenses and 
theodicies the problem of evil is in part assuaged by the promise of personal 
eschatological healing, resurrected bodies, reconciliation with other persons 
(both human and divine), and an eternal and blissful union with God. The 
Christian claim is that God would not create a world where evil has the 
ultimate say, nor would He create a world where there is a perfect balance 
of good and evil. The Christian God is an evil defeater, not an evil balancer. 
God will bring about a state of affairs where goodness will outweigh any 
past evils.36 One way to capture this is to say that God will ensure that human 
persons who participate in horrors will have their horrors defeated. God 
will ensure that these human persons will have a life that, on the whole, is 
one worth living. One day their suffering will cease, and they shall receive 
resurrected bodies and enter into God’s everlasting kingdom.37 A presentist 
has no problem making sense of these claims since past horrors no longer 
exist. The numerically same endurant person who participated in horrors will 
be the numerically same person who will be resurrected in the future. Those 
tragic moments of her past no longer exist, and she has an eternity of future 
healing and bliss to look forward to. I shall argue that a four-dimensional 
eternalist cannot make good on these claims. In particular, a four-dimensional 
eternalist cannot make good on the claim that the participant of horrors will 
cease to participate in those horrors, nor that God will ultimately defeat evil.
A. The Initial Exaggeration of the Problem of Evil
On four-dimensional eternalism persons persist by having temporal 
parts, or stages, that are psychologically continuous with earlier temporal 
35. Eric Steinhart, “The Revision Theory of Resurrection,” Religious Studies 44 (2008): 
66–7.
36. Klaas J. Kraay, “Theism, Possible Worlds, and the Multiverse,” Philosophical Studies 
147 (2010): xxx–xxx; Keith Yandell, “Theology, Philosphy, and Evil,” in For Faith and Clarity: 
Philosophical Contributions to Christian Theology, ed. James K. Beilby (Grand Rapids, MI: 
Baker Academic, 2006); John S. Feinberg, The Many Faces of Evil (Wheaton: Crossway Books, 
2004).
37. Marilyn McCord Adams, Christ and Horrors: The Coherence of Christology (Cambridge: 
Cambridge University Press, 2006).
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parts. On four-dimensional eternalism the entire spacetime manifold exists 
and contains all events. The temporal parts of each object exist only at the 
times at which they exist. From God’s perspective, it simply is the case that 
each temporal part exists at the times at which they do from all eternity. It is 
always the case that a temporal part of O exists at time tx. Further, the entire 
four-dimensional universe is coeternal with God in the sense that there is 
never a state of affairs where God exists without the universe. 
Imagine if you will that Sally is enjoying an absolutely delectable 
cheeseburger. Perhaps it is the best cheeseburger in town. On four-dimensional 
eternalism it is always the case that there is a temporal counterpart, or person 
stage if you prefer, of Sally enjoying this delectable cheeseburger. From all 
eternity this temporal counterpart of Sally is enjoying this cheeseburger. Not 
a bad situation to be in if you ask me.
Imagine a different scenario. There is another temporal counterpart, or 
person stage, of Sally that is experiencing an absolutely tragic evil. From 
all eternity that temporal counterpart of Sally is suffering this great evil. 
This temporal counterpart will never cease to suffer. Granted, other temporal 
counterparts of Sally are enjoying delectable cheeseburgers, or perhaps even 
enjoying the beatific vision. This would appear to offer no consolation to 
the temporal counterpart that is suffering. Her suffering will never cease. 
From all eternity God is sustaining this temporal counterpart in existence. 
This temporal counterpart of Sally is suffering an eternal torment with no 
chance of relief. This temporal counterpart will never be able to say, “Thank 
goodness that is over.” This is a hard picture of reality to maintain. This 
seems to exaggerate the problem of evil for the Christian since it cannot 
make good on the claims that the suffering will cease, and that evil will 
ultimately be defeated.
It should be noted that the intensity of Sally’s suffering is not somehow 
greater on four-dimensionalism than it would be on presentism. The level 
of intensity is the same on either account.38 A stubbed toe is a stubbed toe 
on four-dimensional eternalism and presentism. The difference is that on 
presentism and endurantism Sally will eventually cease to suffer, whereas 
on four-dimensional eternalism the person stage that exists at the time of 
the suffering will never cease to exist at the time of the suffering. Granted, 
Sally has later temporal counterparts that are not suffering, but that does not 
relieve the suffering of the earlier Sally stage. The suffering person stage is 
coeternal with God. It is difficult to see how God could be an evil defeater on 
four-dimensional eternalism.
38. Thanks to Katherine Hawley for bringing this to my attention. 
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B. A Possible Rejoinder
A four-dimensional eternalist might offer a possible rejoinder by saying 
that the future is longer than the past. All of the bad stuff in the past remains, 
but perhaps there are more temporal counterparts of Sally that are enjoying 
great moments of bliss and joy such that, overall, the balance outweighs the 
evil.39 Say that later temporal counterparts of Sally are enjoying the beatific 
vision, joyous fellowship within the communion of the saints, and so on 
forever and ever amen. Overall, Sally’s life is good such that it outweighs 
the evil experiences in her life. If this is the case, perhaps one could still 
maintain that God is an evil defeater whilst conceding that the earlier 
temporal counterparts continue to suffer.
C. At Best, God Is an Evil Balancer, 
Not an Evil Defeater
What must be understood is that on four-dimensional eternalism we 
have a massive number of person stages that are experiencing evil. It is not 
obvious that the number of person stages that are experiencing great bliss 
outweighs the number of person stages that are experiencing great suffering. 
Stages have the same structure as instants. They are as fine-grained as time 
and possible change.40 On worm theory Sally has a temporal counterpart 
at every instant at which she exists. On stage theory there is a person stage 
“Sally” at every instant.
If time is dense and/or continuous there is an instant between any two 
instants. In other words, time is infinitely divisible. This means that the 
number of temporal counterparts and person stages is infinitely divisible. 
What we have are an infinite number of person stages suffering great evil and 
an infinite number of person stages enjoying great bliss. On this scenario it 
is not the case that Sally’s life is overall good. There is a perfect balance of 
good and evil, but Christian theology is committed to the claim that the good 
will outweigh evil. God is not an evil balancer, He is an evil defeater. Four-
dimensional eternalism cannot make good on this claim.
One could escape this by holding that time is discrete and not infinitely 
divisible. On this scenario there could be more person stages enjoying bliss 
than those suffering. Perhaps the four-dimensionalist could argue that on this 
scenario the good does outweigh the evil. Yet, this will not offer a completely 
satisfactory solution since Christian theology is not merely committed to the 
39. Thanks to Katherin Rogers for offering this rejoinder to me. 
40. Katherine Hawley, How Things Persist, 48–52.
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claim that good will ultimately outweigh evil. As discussed further in the 
next section, Christian theology is also committed to the claim that evil will 
cease to exist, and that the suffering of the redeemed will come to an end. 
On this scenario we still have a massive number of temporal parts suffering 
a torment from which they will never find relief.
A four-dimensionalist might try to assuage the problem by saying that 
stages cannot be persons. However, they look enough like persons to make 
the objection go through for each temporal part of a person is a conscious 
thinking thing with free will. In explaining the concept of temporal parts 
and the rejection of a privileged present on four-dimensional eternalism, 
Katherin Rogers explains that a perdurant person is made up of an infinite 
number of temporal parts. Each temporal part believes that she exists at the 
present. “[T]he ‘I’ of an instant ago really exists and perceives an instant 
ago as the present instant, and the ‘I’ of an instant hence really exists and 
perceives an instant hence as the present instant. And these successive time-
slices of ‘me’ do not have access to one another.”41 These temporal parts are 
clearly conscious things. The stage theorist will openly admit this as well 
because she is committed to person stages.42 
However, not all worm theorists will agree. A worm theorist might 
continue to say that temporal parts are not persons. One argument in favor 
of the view that temporal parts are not persons is that temporal parts are too 
brief to be things that could think and act. If the worm theorist offers this 
argument she must explain how a spacetime worm could be a person. The 
worm is a sum of temporal parts that are essentially nonthinking things.
A problem for the four-dimensionalist would arise at this point. How 
could something composed of essentially nonthinking things be a thinking 
a thing? As noted above, the standard account of perdurance holds to a 
supervenience relation between the sum and its parts. If the parts are not 
thinking things, the sum will not be a thinking thing. The four-dimensionalist 
says that personal persistence occurs through psychological continuity, but 
we seem to not have anything here with a psychology. We do not seem to have 
any persons. This allows the four-dimensionalist to say that there are not an 
infinite number of persons suffering, but it does so at the cost of eliminating 
persons from the world. I doubt most Christian four-dimensionalists will 
want to take this route.
The best way around this is to say that each temporal part of a person is 
a thinking thing. Recall from above that four-dimensionalists are typically 
committed to metaphysical universalism. There are an infinite number of 
ways a perdurantist could cut up a spacetime worm. Perhaps the perdurantist 
will grant that stages are far too brief to be persons. She can cut her temporal 
parts thicker than stages such that they are not too brief to be persons. Instead 
41. Rogers, “Anselmian Eternalism,” 7. 
42. Hawley, How Things Persist, 64–7.
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of having person stages, she will have person segments that are comprised 
of various stages.43 However, this will not help assuage the problem of evil 
for we are right back where we began. If spacetime worms can be cut up an 
infinite number of ways into an infinite number of person segments, we have 
an infinite number of suffering temporal parts.
So where does this leave us? Perhaps the four-dimensionalist can modify 
the above rejoinder such that it gives her a prima facie defeat of evil wherein 
the good does outweigh the evil. She can say that time is discrete, and deny 
person segments. Instead, there are a discrete number of person stages in 
the world, and these person stages really do count as persons. The number 
of person stages enjoying great bliss outweighs the number of person stages 
suffering horrors. This would seem to assuage the problem noted above 
somewhat.
I maintain, however, that this does not offer an ultimate defeat of evil. 
At best, it gives us a God who is an evil balancer, and not an evil defeater. I 
concede that, on four-dimensionalism, other temporal counterparts of Sally 
are enjoying the great things of the eschaton, but this does little to assuage 
the eternal suffering of the earlier temporal counterparts of Sally. From the 
perspective of the suffering temporal counterparts there is no relief. Even 
from God’s eternal perspective these temporal counterparts have no relief for 
He is eternally sustaining them in existence. Again, these suffering temporal 
counterparts are coeternal with God. This is not an ultimate defeat of evil.
D. Where Is the Evil Defeater?
Christians are committed to the claim that one day God will ultimately 
triumph over evil and renew creation (for example, Rev. 20–22). It is hard 
to understand how, on this model, God can be said ultimately to triumph 
over evil and renew creation. “Creation is never really purged of evil on this 
view; at most it can be said that evil infects only those parts of creation that 
are earlier than” other events like Christ’s return and the general resurrection 
of the dead. 44 It is difficult to understand how there will be no more tears 
when Christ comes again if other temporal parts of the saints are eternally 
experiencing great evil. The temporal parts of the martyrs from Nero’s day 
are—tenselessly—serving as torches for his parties. Granted, other temporal 
parts of the martyrs are enjoying the new creation, but the flames of the 
previous temporal parts will never be extinguished.
43. Cf. A. P. Taylor, “The Frustrating Problem for Four-Dimensionalism,” Philosophical 
Studies (forthcoming).
44. William Lane Craig, “Response to Paul Helm,” in God & Time: Four Views, ed. 
Gregory Ganssle, 66. See also Keith Ward, “The Temporality of God,” International Journal 
for Philosophy of Religion 50 (2001): 162.
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Several things are needed for God to defeat the horrors of these martyrs. 
First, God must make it the case that their suffering comes to an end. Second, 
God must take them out of the environment where they are vulnerable to 
horrors. Third, God must heal them.45 Four-dimensional eternalism cannot 
make good on these claims. The suffering temporal parts eternally suffer. 
Their suffering cannot come to an end, nor can they be taken out of the 
environment in which they are vulnerable to horrors. This is because their 
temporal and spatial locations are eternally fixed. Their temporal and spatial 
locations are coeternal with God. As such, these temporal parts will never 
be healed. Later temporal counterparts will be enjoying God’s healing, but 
not the counterparts that are eternally suffering. It is awkward, to say the 
least, that the suffering counterparts do not receive any healing, but that the 
counterparts that never have and never will suffer do receive the healing.46 
This seriously calls into question the claim that God is an evil defeater.
There is another awkward tension between Christian theology and four-
dimensionalism. On four-dimensional eternalism evil is coeternal with God. 
There is no state of affairs where God exists and evil does not. From the 
perspective of God, the best perspective, evil eternally exists. One might 
be tempted to say that this is some form of dualistic heresy where good 
and evil are coeternal—perhaps something in the vein of Gnosticism or 
Manichaeism. That is not quite right. On four-dimensional eternalism evil 
is coeternal with God, but unlike God it is contingent. Evil is not on a par 
with God. However, this does not make things much better for one still has to 
reconcile the goodness of God with a coeternal evil that cannot be eradicated. 
The evil that men suffer at particular times will never be defeated. It remains 
eternally. Where, then, is God the evil defeater?
IV. The Eschatological Woes of Four-Dimensionalism 
Eschatology becomes increasingly bizarre if four-dimensional 
eternalism is true.47 Eschatology has several themes, one of which is the 
already/not yet tension in the New Testament.48 The central idea is that Jesus 
has begun the kingdom of God, or begun the “age to come”, such that in a 
sense we can say things like “I am saved” or “the kingdom of God is here.” 
45. This is a modification of Adams’s stages of horror defeat in Christ and Horrors. 
46. Steinhart’s theory of the resurrection is quite explicit that only the resurrected 
counterparts receive healing whilst the suffering counterparts do not. See his, “Revision Theory 
of the Resurrection.”
47. For an interesting discussion on four-dimensionalism and Catholic eschatology see 
Patrick Toner, “Divine Judgment and the Nature of Time,” Faith and Philosophy 22 (2005): 
xxx–xxx. Also Alexander Pruss, “Toner on Judgment and Eternalism,” Faith and Philosophy 
25 (2008): xxx–xxx.
48. For more on the already/not yet see Craig C. Hill, In God’s Time: The Bible and the 
Future (Grand Rapids, MI: Eerdmans, 2002).
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However, the kingdom has not yet been fully realized, or fully consummated. 
This is why we can say things like “I am being saved,” “I will be saved,” 
or “God, please bring about your kingdom.” The apostle Paul often speaks 
of the present experience of salvation and God’s kingdom, but at the same 
time looks forward to the reappearing of Christ and His coming kingdom in 
which the general resurrection of the dead will take place and salvation will 
be complete.49
In light of this theologians often emphasize that living in this already/
not yet creates a prolepsis, or anticipation, toward God.50 Because of the 
in-breaking kingdom of God as displayed through the work of Christ we 
have certain promises from God about the future. These promises are about 
the general resurrection of the dead, the reconciliation of all things to God, 
the new creation, and the end of death and evil. Since we can currently 
experience these things to a limited degree through the work of the Holy 
Spirit, the life of Christ and the promises of God through Christ should call 
us to reorient the way we live our lives. Part of the idea of “prolepsis” is to 
reorient our lives according to what God has done in the past, is doing in 
the present, and will do in the future when Christ reappears. The presentist 
and endurantist has no problem making sense of these claims, but the four-
dimensional eternalist does. 
If presentism and endurantism are true, human persons who currently 
exist can experience the proleptic work of the Holy Spirit in their lives. Since 
the future does not yet exist, a person can have hope for future resurrection. 
She can orient her life around the promises of God through Christ that have 
not yet been fulfilled. The numerically same person who orients her life 
around God’s eschatological promises will be the numerically same person 
who will one day experience the fulfillment of those promises. When that 
day comes, and since the past no longer exists, she can finally have a sigh of 
relief that evil is no more. 
If four-dimensional eternalism is true, I shall argue that these ideas 
within eschatology become perplexing to say the least. A number of questions 
arise at this point for the four-dimensional eternalist. How far should we 
proleptically reorient our lives given that Christ’s reappearing is occurring 
at a particular time that tenselessly exists? Should we be concerned with 
the afterlife? Should we look forward to the new creation? Should we be 
concerned with hell? I shall take each question in turn.
49. Ben Witherington III, The Paul Quest: The Renewed Search for the Jew of Tarsus 
(Downers Grove, IL: InterVarsity, 1998), chap. 8.
50. Richard Bauckham, “Eschatology,” in The Oxford Handbook of Systematic Theology, 
ed. John Webster, Kathryn Tanner, and Ian Torrance (New York: Oxford University Press, 
2007), 308–11.
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A. Should We Proleptically Reorient Our Lives 
Toward the Reappearing of Christ?
One’s own proleptic anticipation of Christ’s future reappearing would 
seem rather odd on four-dimensional eternalism. Let us say that Christ 
comes again in the year 3000. For those of us who are temporal parts, or 
person stages, living at the time 2014, it seems like we can look forward to 
Christ’s reappearing. However, it simply is the case that Christ is tenselessly 
reappearing at the year 3000. This is because both times and the temporal 
parts that exist at those times have equal ontological existence. This creates 
several problems.
In Romans 8:18–25, Paul writes, 
For I consider that the sufferings of this present time are not worth 
comparing with the glory that is to be revealed to us. For the creation 
waits with eager longing for the revealing of the sons of God. For 
the creation was subjected to futility, not willingly, but because of 
him who subjected it, in hope that the creation itself will be set free 
from its bondage to corruption and obtain the freedom of the glory of 
the children of God. For we know that the whole creation has been 
groaning together in the pains of childbirth until now. And not only the 
creation, but we ourselves, who have the firstfruits of the Spirit, groan 
inwardly as we wait eagerly for adoption as sons, the redemption of 
our bodies. For in this hope we were saved. Now hope that is seen is 
not hope. For who hopes for what he sees? But if we hope for what we 
do not see, we wait for it with patience.
In this passage creation and humanity are eagerly awaiting the future 
redemption of all things. When Christ reappears He will bring about the 
resurrection of our bodies, and renew all of creation. Paul tells the Romans 
that they have hope for this future event. They have hope, because this event 
has not yet obtained—they haven’t yet seen it or experienced it. If they had 
experienced it—if the event had obtained—they would have no hope. For no 
one continues to place her hope in something once that thing has obtained. If 
I have high hopes about eating a delectable cheeseburger, my hope comes to 
an end once I take my first bite of that cheeseburger. My hope gives way to 
the enjoyment, or disappointment, of what I had hoped for.
It would seem that, on four-dimensional eternalism, the groaning 
of creation in anticipation of the coming kingdom is futile. The kingdom 
has come at a particular time slice. Those who exist at earlier time slices 
who yearn for the coming kingdom will never experience the kingdom of 
God because they eternally exist at the times at which they do in fact exist. 
Whence then is their hope? These temporal counterparts have placed their 
hope in a future event that is eternally inaccessible to them. Perhaps one can 
say that these temporal counterparts do have genuine hope since the object 
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of their hope is an event that is later than the time slice at which they exist. 
It is the case that they hope for what they do not see, but it would sound like 
a cruel joke to tell them to “wait for it with patience” since no amount of 
patience will ever bring this event closer to them. Those patient temporal 
counterparts will never experience the eschatological glory and redemption 
that Paul speaks of. They may have genuine hope, but it seems that four-
dimensional eternalism renders their hope futile. Their proleptic anticipation 
is in vain.
A related question is worth asking as well. What is Sally actually doing 
when she participates in the Lord’s Supper? Supposedly she is celebrating 
Christ’s death until He comes again (1 Cor. 11:26). However, on four-
dimensional eternalism, Christ has come. Granted, He has not subjectively 
come from the perspective of those existing at earlier times, but objectively 
the event is actual.
Part of the idea of prolepsis is an excited, or celebratory, anticipation 
toward the future fulfillment of God’s promises. When one comes to 
participate in the Eucharist she is celebrating what God has done in the past, 
what He is currently doing, and what He will do in the future. She celebrates 
Christ’s life and His future return when all things will be put right. The body 
of Christ, the Church, is meant to come together to celebrate such things in 
the Lord’s Supper, and as a body proleptically orient themselves toward this 
future return of Christ.
Yet it seems that four-dimensional eternalism cuts against the very idea 
of proleptic anticipation and celebration of the Lord’s Supper. Consider Sally 
again. The Sally person stage that is participating in the Lord’s Supper has 
little to celebrate for she will never experience the resurrected Lord. The 
stage that celebrates the Lord’s Supper until Christ returns is celebrating 
something that is eternally inaccessible to her. What then is she celebrating? 
Perhaps she can celebrate the fact that her later temporal counterparts are 
enjoying the return of Christ, but it seems to me that it will be difficult to 
get into a celebratory mood over such things. It is hard to get excited about 
a party that you cannot possibly attend. How much more so, then, will it be 
difficult to get excited about the return of Christ when you know that you 
cannot possibly experience it? This has the potential to turn the celebration 
of the Lord’s Supper into the mourning of a wake. At best, it has the potential 
to turn the body of Christ into a bunch of party poopers who come to take the 
bread and wine, but can only complain about the fact that they will never see 
the return of their Lord. Four-dimensional eternalism seems to wreak havoc 
on Christian hope and practice.
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B. Should We Be Concerned with the Afterlife?
Let us consider Sally again. Given four-dimensional eternalism there 
are Sally person stages that exist in the year 2014. Person stages are as fine-
grained as instants and possible change. The number of person stages that 
exist in 2014 depends on whether time is continuous or discrete. Either way, 
there are a large number of Sally person stages that exist in 2014. It is the case 
that certain later temporal counterparts of Sally exist in either hell or the new 
earth. However, the Sally stage that exists at this time will never experience 
such things. The Sally stage that exists at this time will only exist at this time. 
She will never have the beatific vision or experience the torments of hell. 
Consider first the new creation. Does Sally have anything to look 
forward to in regards to the new creation? The Sally that exists at this time has 
nothing to look forward to. She cannot possibly experience the joy of being 
reunited with loved ones in the new creation. She will never experience the 
eschatological healing of her body because a later temporal counterpart will 
be the one resurrected. No beatific vision awaits her for she eternally exists at 
the wrong time to experience such things. In moments of hardship, she might 
be tempted to take solace in the fact that one day she will fully experience the 
love and forgiveness of God. But upon reflecting on her ontological status 
within time, she will most likely lose whatever comfort such thoughts were 
intended to bring for she will eternally exist at that moment of hardship.
Perhaps things will not be so dire for certain Sally stages. Say there is 
a Sally stage that is not experiencing a moment of hardship, nor suffering 
a horrendous event. Say instead, there is a particular Sally stage that is 
experiencing a rather tantalizing sin. Should she be worried about the eternal 
consequences of this sin? Should she be worried about the eternal destiny 
of her soul? It seems she should not. She already knows that she will never 
experience new creation, but she can take solace in the fact that she has 
no worry of hell either. The stage that exists at this time will never have to 
experience hell. She eternally exists at the moment of enjoying this tantalizing 
sin. No need to worry about eternal consequences, for she will never have 
to experience them. For all eternity she will experience the pleasure of this 
tantalizing sin. 
Perhaps the four-dimensionalist could argue that this particular 
Sally stage has a duty to seek the kingdom of God so that later temporal 
counterparts can enjoy the beatific vision and not experience the torments 
of hell. As such, this Sally stage should not take solace in the fact that she 
cannot possibly experience hell. Instead she should be concerned about the 
eternal destiny of her later temporal counterparts.51 But surely her moral 
51. See Taylor for an argument that four-dimensionalism is not compatible with satisfying 
obligations to persons with regard to the person’s well-being. Taylor, “The Frustrating Problem 
for Four-Dimensionalism.”
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motivation is significantly undercut in the same way that her hope about the 
future is undercut. It eternally is the case that Sally’s temporal counterparts 
exist at the times and places that they in fact exist. The destiny of Sally’s 
temporal counterparts is eternally fixed for those times eternally obtain.
Concluding Remarks
I have argued that four-dimensionalism exaggerates the problem of evil 
for Christian theism, and that it eradicates the proleptic hope of the believer 
as well as wreaks havoc on eschatology. My suggestion is that Christian 
philosophers and theologians should reconsider their commitment to four-
dimensional eternalism in light of these arguments. Ultimately, I would 
suggest that Christians should abandon four-dimensional eternalism and 
return to the loving arms of presentism. Presentism served the Church well 
for over 1,800 years, and I say it could continue to do so again.52 Granted, 
presentism is not compatible with divine timelessness as noted above. So 
presentism and endurantism cannot deliver the alleged theological benefits 
of maintaining divine timelessness. But I doubt that divine timelessness 
is worth maintaining anyway.53 Instead, I posit that Christians should 
embrace presentism and endurantism, and suffer or enjoy, the theological 
consequences that follow.54
52. John Bigelow, “Presentism and Properties,” Nous 30 (1996): 35. See also Dean 
Zimmerman, “The A-Theory of Time, Presentism, and Open Theism,” in Science and Religion 
in Dialogue, ed. Melville Y. Stewart (Malden: Blackwell, 2010), 793.
53. For arguments against divine timelessness see my In Search of a Timeless God 
(forthcoming). 
54. I would like to thank Oliver Crisp, Katherine Hawley, Chantal Incandela, Kate Rogers, 
Alan Torrance, Keith Yandell, and the editors and reviewers of Philosophia Christi for helpful 
comments on earlier drafts of this paper.
